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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Tenney, Andrew 
NYSID: 
DIN: 81-B-2137 
Appearances: Alyson S. Clark, Esq. 
383 Broadway 
Facility: 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
Fort Edward, New York 12828 
Great Meadow CF 
07-078-18 B 
Decision appealed: June 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 21-
months. 
Board Member(s) Crangle, Coppola, Berliner 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived November 9, 2018 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon; Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
1' e undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_Vacated, reman.ded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de ~ovo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reason~ for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ te findin_gs of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the fomate's Counsel, if any, on J 6 CJ bb 
f 
l 11 ;mbutinn: Appeals l !nit·- Appc:llam - A.ppcllanf s C.ounsd - Inst. Parole Fik' - ( 'cnmtl 1-'ik 
;• :'!H('(R; ! ! I ·2(1lXJ 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Name: Tenney, Andrew  DIN: 81-B-2137
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Appellant challenges the June 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 21-month hold.   
Appellant raises the following issues in his brief: (1) the Board’s decision was arbitrary 
and capricious and irrational because too much emphasis was placed on his multiple, serious 
crimes of conviction and his criminal history; (2) the Board should have provided greater weight 
to Appellant’s institutional accomplishments, “contributions to society”, release plans, and 
remorse; (3) the Board’s decision was predetermined; (4) Appellant “is an ideal candidate to be 
paroled…in light of his scoring low on the COMPAS Risk Assessment”; (5) the Board’s decision 
was tantamount to a resentencing of Appellant; (6) the Board is not permitted to consider 
Appellant’s disciplinary tickets; and (7) the 21-month hold was excessive. 
As to the first and second issues, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely 
as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering 
if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will 
not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 
259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  “Although these standards are no longer 
repeated in the [Board’s] regulation, this in no way modifies the statutory mandate requiring their 
application.”  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2.  A conclusion that an inmate fails 
to satisfy any one of the considerations set forth in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) is an 
independent basis to deny parole.  See, e.g., Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386 
(4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268; Matter 
of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).    
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to 
the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal 
behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 
881 (1st Dept. 1983).  While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to 
parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477.  Thus, it is well 
settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, 
e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter 
of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 
235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each 
factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 
1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 
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A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17.  In 
the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it 
must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 
914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 
A.D.2d 128. 
As to the third issue, there is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined based upon 
the instant offense.  Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 
(3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 
622 (3d Dept. 2000).   
As to the fourth issue, in 2011, the law was amended to require procedures incorporating 
risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law 
§ 259–c(4); 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §8002.2(a).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the 
COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 
(3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 
640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 
30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 
N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the 
requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the 
statutory factors including the instant offense.  The amendments also did not change the three 
substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole. 
See Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS instrument cannot mandate a particular 
result.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, 
the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory 
factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera 
v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord 
Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter 
of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  Furthermore, 
declining to afford the COMPAS controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter 
of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).   
The 2011 amendments require the Board to incorporate risk and needs assessment 
principles to “assist” in measuring an inmate’s rehabilitation and likelihood of success upon 
release.  See Executive Law § 259-c(4). The statute thus does not clearly create a presumption of 
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rehabilitation based on a favorable risk and needs assessment, let alone a presumption of parole 
release requiring the Board to provide countervailing evidence.  Indeed, while the Board might, 
for example, find an inmate sufficiently rehabilitated to satisfy the first prong of the standard—
that the inmate will “live and remain at liberty without violating the law,” the Board could also 
find, in its discretion, that the inmate’s release would be incompatible with the welfare of society, 
or would unduly deprecate the seriousness of a crime. The text of the statute therefore flatly 
contradicts the inmate’s assertion that certain low COMPAS scores create a presumption of 
release. See Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d at 1397.  Finally, we note that the Board in 
its decision specifically stated reasons for departure from certain scores contained in Appellant’s 
COMPAS instrument.   
As to the fifth issue, Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an 
improper resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine 
the propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set 
forth therein. See Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 
A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. 
Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  Appellant has 
not in any manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 
A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016).   
As to the sixth issue, the Board may consider an inmate’s failure to comply with DOCCS 
rules in denying parole.  See Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 
42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 
104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); Matter of Stanley v. New York 
State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 
N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012).  It is not improper for the Board to consider a DOCCS 
prison disciplinary finding against an inmate, even if the case is pending on appeal at the time of 
the Parole Board Release Interview.  Matter of Arce v. Travis, 273 A.D.2d 564, 710 N.Y.S.2d 554 
(3d Dept. 2000); see also Matter of Warmus v. New York State Dep’t of Corrs. & Cmty. 
Supervision, Index No. 7516-17, Decision, Order & Judgment dated Sept. 10, 2018 (Sup. Ct. 
Albany Co.) (O’Connor, A.S.C.J.).  Appellant is not automatically entitled to a new parole release 
interview even if there is a subsequent reversal of a DOCCS disciplinary violation.  Matter of 
Collins v. Hammock, 52 N.Y.2d 798, 436 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1980).   
As to the seventh issue, the Board’s decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 
24 months is within the Board’s discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 
259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b). Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 
A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 
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(2002); see also Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 
2013).  Appellant has failed to demonstrate that his hold of 21 months for discretionary release was 
excessive or improper. 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
